ACRONYMS

INTRODUCTION
Using plutonium as fuel in commercial power reactors is a way to dispose of the material formerly used in nuclear weapons. It is important that the structural integrity of the reactors not be compromised by the use of weapons-grade MOX fuels. Use of MOX fuels will result in an increase in the neutron flux and heating rates! The fission spectra for 235U and 239Pu and the neutrons per fission for each are shown in Fig. 1 for equal power densities. Because each 239Pu fission produces an average of 19% more neutrons than a 235U fission and because of the slightly higher energy neutrons produced by 239Pu fission, a MOX core could result in up to 20% higher fast flux. A combination of MOX fuel and conventional fuel would result in a somewhat smaller increase in the fast flux. Because nuclear radiation changes the properties of met&, it is important to make sure that the higher neutron flux associated with the use of MOX fuel will not cause changes that will compromise the structural integrity of the reactors in which it is used. The effects of neutron radiation on the properties of structural metals is discussed in Sect. 2.
ORNL-DWG
Although the only reference to the impact of conversion to MOX fuel on reactor structural components found during this study was a note in a paper by J. Van Vyve2 that "the fast fluence on the pressure vessel is not increased with the MOX fuel core management," it should not be assumed that adverse structural aspects will not occur for the U.S. reactors (Ref. 2 is an attachment to this report). Detailed analysis is recommended to ensure that the structural effects are correctly anticipated. Consideration of recent studies of pressure vessel embrittlement3-8 and reactor internals aging degradation in commercial power reactors9-15 is recommended as the best way to identify the most likely areas to be impacted by conversion to MOX fuels. This work is discussed in Sect. 3.
RADIATION EFFECTS IN METALS
Radiation damage is primarily a result of displacement of atoms in the structural metals being knocked out of their location in the crystal lattice by collision with fast neutrons. [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] There are other mechanisms that cause displacement of atoms. For example, one of the isotopes of nickel has a high cross section for thermal neutrons that ultimately results in 340-keV iron atoms and 4.7-MeV alpha particles that are just as damaging as extremely fast neutrons.l79 l9 Much of the data on radiation effects are given in terms of the total neutron fluence for neutrons with an energy level above 1 MeV or above some other energy level. A more refined way of presenting radiation effects data is in terms of the number of displacements per atom (dpa), which is an estimate of how many times each atom is moved from its lattice position.
The displacement of atoms in the crystal lattice can induce swelling in metals and can increase the creep and stress relaxation rate.23 This can cause distortion, including bowing of fuel and control rods when the neutron fiuence varies across the diameter. It may also reduce the preload in bolts and springs. Irradiation enhances stress corrosion cracking in some metals, especially austenitic stainless Tensile strength is generally increased by irradiation, but ductility and fracture toughness are generally decreased. There is a transition temperature below which the toughness of ferritic steels decreases markedly. The effect of temperature on the fracture toughness of ferritic pressure vessel steels29 is shown in Fig. 2 . The transition temperature is raised by iriadiation. There is also some evidence that the toughness 
COMPONENTS THAT MAY BE CHALLENGED BY A CHANGE TO MOX FUEL
Increased neutron flux levels and gamma and neutron heating rates that may result from use of MOX fuels may adversely affect some components, including the reactor pressure vessel and the internal components. Aging degradation studies for reactors using conventional fuel are suggested to be used as the starting point for evaluating the potential impact of converting to MOX fuels.
REACTOR VESSEL
The effects of radiation on reactor pressure vessels have received considerable attention because of the catastrophic consequences of a brittle fracture. Several Russian VWR-440 reactor vessels have been annealed in-situ to lower the transition temperature, which was approaching the minimum operating temperature of the vessel.
An annealing test was conducted on the canceled Marble Hill Plant reactor vessel to evaluate annealing of U.S. reactor vessels. Current thinking is that the transition temperature shift will not be large enough to restrict the operating life of the reactors being considered for burning MOX fuels because those reactors were designed so that the fast neutron flux in the vessel is lower than in some of the early reactors. BelgonucIeaire2 had Tractebel Engineering and Framatome review the impact of MOX fuel loading in light-water reactors (LWRs) on plant licensing. Two core management strategies were considered:
yearly cycles with one-fourth core reload, and extended cycles with one-third core reload.
One of the areas considered was reactor pressure vessel embrittlement. Because of the low recycling ratio, the review showed that the fast fluence on the pressure vessel is not increased with the MOX fuel core management.
Surveillance specimen r e s~l t s~9~~ from the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) indicated a more pronounced degradation of fracture toughness than expected, as shown in Fig. 4 . An early theory for this discrepancy is that the thermal neutrons were responsible. A more recent explanation32 is that intense gamma rays enhanced the damage. It is likely that the spectral shift compared to other radiation experiments is a contributing factor. Thus, detailed studies are warranted to evaluate the possibility of an appreciably greater rate of embrittlement when MOX fuels are used. Tables 1 and 2 from Ref. 11 give an overview of the aging issues for pressurized-water reactor (PWR) and boiling-water reactor (BWR) pressure vessels, respectively.
Because of the catastrophic consequences of a reactor vessel brittle fracture, a detailed study should be done to ensure that it will not be necessary to cease operation before vessel embrittlement becomes excessive.
REACTOR INTERNALS
Except for cases where failure of reactor internal components could be the initiator of a sequence of events that lead to failure of the reactor vessel, structural failure of reactor internals is not as catastrophic as failure of the reactor vessel because the reactor vessel would prevent release of radioactive debris. However, structural failure of internal components can have severe economic consequences. The fuel assemblies are not addressed in this report because extensive fuel assembly qualification is planned. The control rod drive mechanisms and other reactor internals are addressed. The majority of reactor internals are made of type 304 stainless steel. Studies of the residual life of major LWR internal components identified corrosion, including stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC), fatigue, mechanical wear, erosion, embrittlement, creep, and stress relaxation as the primary aging-related degradation mechanisms. Of these, reported failure information and laboratory tests indicate that SCC, fatigue, and mechanical wear are the principal causes of aging degradation.
However, the aging-related degradation mechanisms that are most likely affected by converting to MOX fuels are IASCC, embrittlement, creep, and stress relaxation. Fatigue may also be impacted by higher thermal stresses because of the higher heating rates and flow-induced vibrations. The potential fatigue problems will not be discussed further here, but should be addressed.
The aging degradation studies examined documented failures of reactor internals to identify the important degradation mechanisms. Therefore, real problems were highlighted as opposed to hypothetical problems.
PWRs
The effects of fast neutron fluxes are most pronounced in regions near the core. Reactor internals such as core baffle, core barrel, thermal shield, surveillance specimen holder tubes, core support plates, and incore instrumentation guide tubes are susceptible to irradiation-assisted SCC and radiation-induced embrittlement.
The thimble tubes, the high-strength steel bolts used on the reactor internals, the thermal shield, and the core barrel are subject to high-cycle fatigue damage caused by flow-induced vibrations. The highstrength fasteners are also subject to SCC and stress relaxation caused by neutron irradiation. Other degradation mechanisms acting on the reactor internals are irradiation and thermal embrittlement, wear, and fretting. Potential (and actual) failure modes for reactor internals include leakage from a thinned thimble tube (a breach in the primary pressure boundary), broken bolts, loose parts, and fuel damage from baffle jetting. Table 3 summarizes the aging concerns for PWR reactor internals. Table 4 gives a summary of aging issues for BWR reactor internals. Several BWR reactor internalsfor example, jet pumps, feedwater spargers, fasteners, and the core plate-have highly stressed materials with chromium-depleted grain boundaries, crevices, or cold work, and are susceptible to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC). The heat-affected zones of the welds that attach the reactor internals to the pressure vessel are also susceptible to IGSCC, and cracks caused by IGSCC may propagate into the pressure vessel base metal. The top guide structure and core shroud are exposed to relatively high fast neutron fluences and are susceptible to IASCC, which may occur at relatively low stresses. The jet pumps and feedwater spargers are susceptible to high-cycle fatigue caused by flow-induced vibrations. Cast stainless steel components, such as orificed fuel support pieces, may experience both thermal and irradiation embrittlement.
BWRs
Greene33*34 studied the aging of BWR control rod drive systems. The primary causes of control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) aging were identified as embrittlement, fatigue fracture, and thermal degradation of the graphitic seals, nitrided surface corrosion, mishandling and rebuilding errors occurring during CRDM maintenance, and, to a lesser extent, improper storage support.
Radiation-induced degradation is suspected to be the cause of certain effects observed in the spud, the CRDM component that engages the control rod assembly blade via the uncoupling rod. There have been reports of the "fingers" of this Inconel X-750 component being easily bent after a prolonged service history (>15 years) in the reactor vessel. 
CONCLUSIONS
The impact of conversion to MOX fuels is expected to be manageable but must be addressed to ensure safe and reliable operation. There is a continual need to maintain a high plant capacity and availability in the face of the aging phenomena even when conventional fuels are used. It should be noted that an active European network in structural integrity35 is addressing these issues for both reactor pressure vessels and reactor internal components.
INTRODUCTION -BELGIAN NUCLEAR CONTEXT
The Belgian Utility ELECTRABEL operates seven PWR nuclear reactors located on two sites (see Table I ). These units are all operated as baseload plants and supply presently about 55 % of the electricity produced in Belgium. Belgium is one of the top nuclear countries in that sense, including for plant performance : these units have experienced an average load factor of 85 YO from industrial operation. Three of them have also been uprated (4 to 10 % thermal uprating'; 7 to 11 % electrical uprating), partly through steam generator and low pressure turbine rotors replacements.
To best fit the grid power demand diagram, four units are operated in extended cycles (15 to 18 months, corresponding to 425 to 510 EFPD) and the three others in yearly cycles (325 EFPD), the target load factor being 89 to 92 % yearly average. The detailed evaluation of the three options clearly showed that the first one -immediate recycling as MOX fuel -was the best solution on the technical, economical and nonproliferation points of view.
In fact it is the only option that has reached an industrial development stage, and MOX fuel irradiation has been successfully and safely done for about 20 years in commercial reactors in France, Germany and Switzerland.
On the economical point of view, a study performed in 1990 upon the request of the Ministry of Economy clearly showed that a non recycling option of the recovered Pu would lead to 2 to 5 billion BEF (60 to 150 million USD) overcosts compared to MOX recycling. These overcosts essentially result from the necessity to condition, store, control and dispose off the non recycled Pu.
MOX RECYCLING PROGRAM AND FUEL MANAGEMENT
Program design bases
The Similarly, the main design objective for the study was that MOX loading must allow a safe operation of the plant and should not require modifications in the plant design and plant operation. In particular, the number of control rods clusters in core should not be increased and the in-core fuel management should not be modified, to minimize the costs.
The following basic assumptions of the MOX program proceed from this design objective :
recycling of MOX fuel assemblies will take place in two plants in order to bum the recovered plutonium with a recycling ratio of about 20 %, low enough to avoid important core perturbation ;
the two plants -Doel 3 and Tihange 2-are of the FRAMATOME 900 MWe type and are similar to the French plants in which plutonium is recycled ; one MOX fuel assembly design will be developed even if the operation strategies (enrichment of U-bearing fuel, cycle length, ...) of the two plants are different ; the discharge bumup of the MOX fuel assemblies will be similar to the discharge burnup of U fuel assemblies : 45000 MWd/tHM. This is significantly higher than the current irradiation level in France or Germany ; the MOX fuel assemblies will be directly stored under water and not in the dry storage area; so minimizing exposure and diversion risks ; the existing procurement policy (concurrent loading of U and MOX fuel of different vendors) must be kept.
Fuel design and management
The MOX fuel design is based on plutonium coming from the reprocessing of U02 fuel irradiated to 45000 MWd/tU in a 900 MWe plant. The isotopic composition used for the studies is as follows :
Pu 23% In-core fuel management applied in Doel 3 and Tihange 2 has not been changed with MOX fuel loading from the one applied for previous cycles with uranium fuel, in terms of cycle length, reload size and peaking factors.
The main data on the in-core fuel management presently applied in the two units are given in Table II . As this table identifies, Tihange 2 and Doel 3 were uprated making Doel 3 the most powerful 3-loop plant in the world. However, this was shown to have no adverse effect on the MOX fuel rod design, provided that MOX fuel assemblies are located at the core periphery at the end of irradiation (IN-OUT loading scheme).
The loading pattern of Tihange 2 (equilibrium cycle) is given on Fig. 2 . It combines simultaneous loading of poisoned U02 fuel (Gadolinia rods with 8 YO Gd2O3) and MOX fuel assemblies.
LICENSING EFFORT AND TIME SCHEDULE
Extent of the licensing work
Clearly, the design objectives were to minimize the licensing effort, the associated risk and costs and the operational constraints.
Meanwhile, the Belgian Safety Authorities requested that a full licensing process should be conducted, with a complete review of the FSAR of the plants, considering that introducing MOX fuel was a major change to the original plant design and licensing.
This review performed by TRACTEBEL ENGINEERING and FRAMATOME addressed the impact of MOX fuel loading on the following areas : The in-core fuel management and safety evaluation studies were performed by FRAMATOME for the two core management strategies. Only a few accidents (large LOCA, Large Steam Line Break, Rod Ejection, Rod withdrawal-reactor Subcritical, Rod Drop) had to be reassessed, with consideration of MOX fuel in the core.
Thanks to the low recycling ratio, the review showed that : the neutronic characteristics of the core are only slightly modified ; the existing control rods can easily satisfy the shutdown margin requirements ;. On the fuel design point of view, FRAGEMA was able to demonstrate that all the fuel design criteria are met, provided that the active length of the fuel is reduced by 1 %, to increase the plenum volume for fission gas release.
Licensing schedule
As said earlier, a full licensing process was conducted for this project. In Belgium, this process is managed by a Special Commission composed of representatives of the Public Health, Environment and Employment Administrations, of scientific experts and of a representative of the Technical Advisory Body, competent in the field of Nuclear Safety.
The Special Commission is also in charge of collecting the advises resulting from the public inquiry at the local, regional and federal levels.
A public review was decided and conducted at the political level on the back end issues (use of MOx fuel and management of the spent fuel) in parallel with the administrative licensing process. This obviously slowed down somewhat the licensing process. In total, the licensing process lasted about 5 years, from start-up of the feasibility study to the first loading of MOX fuel. This process is summarized in Table 111 .
The last one and a half year were dedicated to final fuel and core design verification, to take power upratings into account, and to final update of the FSAR.
ON-SITE IMPLEMENTATION
Plant update
As MOX fuel introduction did not modify the plant essential systems, most of the work perfomed on site concerned the following aspects : 
Safeguards
All Plutonium in Belgium is under strict international safeguards. As founding member of EURATOM, Belgium has handed over since 1959 the responsibility for safeguards within its own temtory to the Community's executive body, the Commission. As such nuclear materials in Belgium were subjected to international safeguards right after the start of the first multinational nuclear safeguards system established by EURATOM. On The fresh MOX fuel assemblies are in Belgium transported by road in sealed containers from the fabrication plant in Dessel to the nuclear reactor sites. In presence of the EURATOMAAEA inspectors the MOX fuel containers are unloaded and unsealed. After receipt of the MOX fuel assemblies, the assemblies are immediately stored under water in a dedicated area of the spent fuel pond where they are placed under permanent short interval surveillance by under water and water surface monitoring cameras. All MOX fuel assembly manipulations must be executed in the presence of EURATOMAAEA inspectors, and during execution all possible MOX fuel assembly routing schemes are permanently monitored by adequate C/S systems. 
FUEL HANDLING
Another important part of the project implementation is related to the MOX fuel assemblies reception at the plant. Regarding the important gamma and neutron dose rates projected for Mox fuel assemblies (see Table IV ) compared to uranium fuel, and the potential risk of alpha contamination in case of fuel defect, the Safety Authorities requested to implement the following :
Evaluate the full safety of handling MOX fuel in the fuel access area and, if needed, implement the necessary modification. This could cover such aspects as fuel handling equipment, ventilation, shielding, radiation monitoring. Proceed to a detailed review of the handling process so as to minimize the radiation exposure, establish specific handling procedures and perform a full scale blank test with the actual container and a dummy fuel assembly. Install additional shielding, if needed. Install specific monitoring equipment to detect a potential alpha contamination in the air. Provide the personnel with adequate gamma and neutron radiation monitoring devices.
The detailed review of the handling process showed that fuel access building and equipment could be used mostly as is, with only minor modification in Tihange 2, were it was decided to modify the normal handling process, with direct introduction of the MOX fuel in the spent fuel building, reducing by this the total handling time and operators exposure. The access plug was motorized to ease the manipulations.
In the two plants, a detailed A U R A type review of the handling process was performed, to evaluate the individual contributions of each handling step to the total dose rate. This approach helped optimizing the handling process. It has to be noted that no additional shielding was installed in the plants, as good practice measures showed to be at least as efficient to minimize the total exposure to the plant personnel since efficient shielding against neutron flux, which contributes to about 50 YO of the dose rate, is necessarily bulky, which tends to complicate the handling process. The only specific equipment finally installed is a remote video inspection equipment of the fuel assemblies.
The total collective exposure was initially estimated to be 18 man-mSv for the reception of 8 MOX fuel assemblies, based on a preliminary analysis, It was reduced to 7.7 man-mSv after detailed A U R A review and finally to 5 man-mSv after a full testing of the handling process with a container and a dummy assembly. Main experience feed back is as follows :
OPERATING EXPERIENCE
Core physical tests at beginning of cycle Calculated parameters are all well within tolerance limits compared to measured values. This is particularly true for critical boron concentration (max. 30 ppm difference) and kinetic parameters.
Core follow up Except some difficulties with activity rates in MOX fuel (more difficult to predict with the high Pu content in the center of the fuel assembly), other parameters are well predicted, notably power distribution and boron letdown curve (see Fig. 3 for Tihange 2 -first cycle with MOX fuel).
A total of 25 in-core flux maps have been processed so far.
Plant operation
Both plants have worked as planned, Tihange 2 achieving a 98.3 % availability factor during the first cycle with MOX fuel, with a load factor of 95.4 %. The reinforced surveillance set up on core follow-up by the Safety Authorities during the first cycle is no more applied. So, plant operation is identical to another unit.
MOX fuel handling
Actual total collective exposure for reception of 8 MOX fuel assemblies is equal to 3.5 man-mSv, and the transport and handling process is now routinely applied.
CONCLUSION
most economical and technically suitable recycling process in Belgium for the plutonium coming from the reprocessing is clearly to use it as MOX fuel assemblies in PWR power reactors immediately after production. Belgian industry never changed its position on this matter and succeeded, after a long and often difficult political debate, in getting the authorization to load MOx fuel assemblies in Doe1 3 and Tihange 2.
Load and operate PWR power plants with MOx fuel assemblies is not really a technical concern : the long international experience shows it is perfectly safe and economic. The safety and licensing process has confirmed that MOx fuel loading had negligible impact on plant safety and operation.
The experience feedback gained so far shows that there are no practical differences for a Utility to load MOX fuel instead of uranium fuel, on the plant operation point of view. In Belgium, MOX fuel assemblies are loaded together with uranium fuel assemblies supplied by other fuel vendors, letting even the Utility to make the economical and technical choice for supply of uranium fuel independently from MOX fuel. 
